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Abstract 
This study sets out to establish which Buddhist values contrasted with or were shared by adolescents from 
a non-Buddhist population. A survey of attitude toward a variety of Buddhist values was fielded in a 
sample of 352 non-Buddhist schoolchildren aged between 13 and 15 in London. Buddhist values where 
attitudes were least positive concerned the worth of being a monk/nun or meditating, offering candles & 
incense on the Buddhist shrine, friendship on Sangha Day, avoiding drinking alcohol, seeing the world as 
empty or impermanent and Nirvana as the ultimate peace. Buddhist values most closely shared by non-
Buddhists concerned the Law of Karma, calming the mind, respecting those deserving of respect, 
subjectivity of happiness, welfare work, looking after parents in old age and compassion to cuddly 
animals. Further significant differences of attitude toward Buddhism were found in partial correlations 
with the independent variables of sex, age and religious affiliation. Correlation patterns paralleled those 
previously described in theistic religions. Findings are applied to spiritual, moral, social and cultural 
development and for the teaching of religious to pupils of no faith adherence. The study recommends that 
quantitative psychometrics employed to conceptualize Buddhist values by discriminant validity in this 
study could be extended usefully to other aspects of the study of Buddhism, particularly in quest of 
validity in the conceptualization of Buddhist identity within specifically Buddhist populations.  
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What makes you not a Buddhist?: A preliminary mapping of values1 
The relative scarcity with which Buddhism is mentioned in the British Religion in 
Numbers database2 or a variety of academic journals of religious research emphasizing 
quantitative methods,3 confirms Wallace’s (2007, 78) observation that Buddhism4 is 
under-represented in quantitative research relative to Christianity and Islam. The lack 
may be caused simply by Buddhist scholars being unfamiliar with this methodology of 
research or it may involve some resistance on behalf of Buddhists themselves. Since 
study of Buddhism, no less than for research on other subjects (Kelly 2006), should be 
defined to a significant degree through critical discourse between researchers and the 
community of its practitioners, the apparent differences of opinion concerning 
methodologies are important for this article to reconcile before presenting its own 
quantitative study of attitudes to Buddhism. This article starts by justifying why 
quantitative methods have been chosen to explore the nature of Buddhist religiosity – 
defending the theoretical assumptions underlying these methods in a way that hopefully 
reassures practitioners of Buddhism that potential findings in no way detract from the 
emancipatory benefits of the research. The article continues by presenting a study in 
discriminant validity concerning Buddhist identity – in more layman’s terms as an 
exploration of ‘what makes a person not a Buddhist’. This article consists of three parts. 
Part one reconciles Buddhist studies with the use of quantitative methodologies of 
research. Part two presents a quantitative study of adolescent attitudes to Buddhism. 
Part three discusses the contribution of this study to understanding Buddhism while 
suggesting guidance in the application of findings to enactable policy and practice. 
 The contribution this article makes to knowledge, apart from bridging the 
aforementioned methodological gap, is to help to bring Buddhism into dialogue with the 
psychologies of religion and individual differences. The quantitative study presented 
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here maps the boundaries and overlaps of Buddhist values into the attitudes of non-
Buddhists. Correlation of results by sex, age and religious affiliation help clarify the 
degree to which these factors can account for observed value patterns. 
 
Part 1: Reconciling Buddhist Studies with Quantitative Methodologies 
Some Key Terms 
The key term to define when justifying the use of quantitative data in measuring 
Buddhist religiosity is ‘validity’ which means the extent to which an instrument 
measures or correlates with the theorized scientific construct it purports to measure 
(Pennington 2003, 37) – in this study, the relevant construct is Buddhist religiosity, or 
religiosity unique to Buddhists. Validity can be divided into several components – four 
of which are of direct relevance here. Construct validity is concerned with examining 
how the operational form of the construct works in the light of theory. Face validity is 
what an instrument superficially appears to measure – often what ‘seems valid’ to the 
investigator – but which needs to be tested additionally against the views of a panel of 
experts or a representative sample of the respondents or target audience. This aspect of 
validity is often a good starting point for research, but in social science, on its own, is 
not a secure predictor of validity. Content validity is the extent to which a measure 
represents all facets of a social construct. Discriminant validity [or in some places 
‘divergent’ validity (Cooper 2002, 60)] is the degree to which an operation that is not 
similar to other operations it theoretically should not be similar to. 
 Triangulation, from the point of view of scientific research, has been described 
as ‘an attempt to map out or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human 
behaviour by studying it from more than one standpoint’ (Cohen et al. 2007, 141). Four 
types of triangulation can help make scientific measurement more trustworthy (Denzin 
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1978): namely, data triangulation (mixing of data types); investigator triangulation 
(interresearcher reliability); theory triangulation (a dataset can be triangulated against 
itself [without being a tautology] e.g. positioning theory versus deductive approach); 
and methodological triangulation (multimethod research). In this piece of research, 
triangulation has been ensured through methodological means – namely through the 
hermeneutic cycle between quantitative and qualitative methodologies in relation to the 
experimental subject matter, in keeping with Cohen et al.’s (2007) advice that 
methodological triangulation usually implies use of both quantitative and qualitative 
data. Ideally, the data from the qualitative research should feed into the survey 
instrument used for the quantitative research, generating data, which, in turn, provide 
further detail on, and refer back to, data from the qualitative research in a hermeneutic 
cycle of enquiry. In ‘top-down’ research, the cycle starts with a researcher’s a priori 
framework, often with predetermined categories to be tested experimentally. If the 
hermeneutic cycle of study starts from the premise of an entirely participant-generated 
agenda, such triangulation can be said to be based in ‘grounded theory’ (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967). In ‘bottom-up’ research, especially grounded theory, categories emerge 
through examination of the data. 
 The term ‘hermeneutic cycle’ usually implies moving back and forth between 
individual and group in anthropology or between the specific and the general in textual 
analysis – but in this article the term is taken to mean the process of methodological 
triangulation between alternative application of quantitative and qualitative 
interrogation of data. In practice, it is rare to find research entirely divorced from some 
sort of a priori researcher-imposed conceptual framework – and realistically a final text 
can be regarded as ‘negotiated’ between researcher and participant viewpoints (Clifford 
1997, 210).  
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 There are many different approaches to psychology, but given that the study of 
psychology can focus on the respects in which a person is like all other people, like 
some other people or like no other people (Kluckhohn et al. 1953, 53), the individual 
differences approach to psychology locates itself within ‘differential psychology’ i.e. 
the ways in which a person is like ‘some other people’. It is an approach that remains 
mindful of the important variation between individuals that can be masked by averaging 
and is based on an assumption that human behaviour is not entirely random but has 
discernable patterns to it and that deeper and more covert organizing factors can be 
accessed and measured by appropriately devised psychometric instruments (Francis 
2009, 127-8). The approach is more widely known for aptitude psychometrics and 
predicting differences and similarities in human thought, emotionality and behaviour 
(Chamorro-Premuzic 2007, 2).  
 Finally, from the point of view of operational definitions of religious affiliation, 
respondents are labelled ‘non-Buddhist’ because given the chance to self-identify their 
religious affiliation, all chose non-Buddhist affiliations. Although such labling is 
potentially vulnerable to nominalism, psychologists of religion continue to consider 
self-assigned affiliation a significant dimension of religiosity (Fane 1999) – although 
not necessarily a secure proxy for other dimensions of religiosity, such as belief or 
practice. 
  
What scientific research has become in the early years of the 21st Century 
The nature of scientific enquiry has changed under the influence of post-positivism and 
the resulting balance between the paradigms of empiricism and interpretivism has 
resulted in that of critical realism. Far from its former monolithic status (Garrison 
1986), scientific enquiry at the beginning of the 21st Century is considered provisional 
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and no longer encourages a culture of science that accepts certainty (Erickson and 
Gutierrez 2002, 22; Hartas 2010, 23). Social sciences, often provide data that is no more 
than a snapshot with a generalizability that has a short ‘half-life’ – perhaps lasting only 
until a new experimental paradigm comes along (Berliner 2002, 20). It is tempting to 
believe that pieces of research will tie up loose ends but this is not always the case – 
where respect for ethical correctness toward participants might be more important than 
experimental results. To give an example, sometimes where consent from schools 
concerning access to participants is not sufficiently forthcoming, this might have an 
important adverse effect on the sample size (Kay and Smith 2001). Sometimes work is 
deemed preliminary because it is exploratory. The word ‘preliminary’ does less to 
detract from the worth of research than highlight a subject area for the attention of more 
detailed future research. Where research in education has been criticized it is not 
because it has been small in scale, but because it has been partisan, methodologically 
problematic, non-empirical or lacking in relevance or impact (so-called ‘blue skies’ 
research)(Tooley and Darby 1998). Furthermore, scientific rigour might demand that 
the object of research be mapped both by a process of confirmation and elimination, 
since the deductive processes of science are often most powerful when employing a 
process of elimination to explore possibilities – leaving no conceptual stone unturned 
until due effort had been made to disprove a hypothesis. Science tends to progress 
through research that falsifies rather than confirms theories (Popper 1963). Hence, 
trying to find what is unique to Buddhists by looking at the values shared with a non-
Buddhist population (a process of elimination) would be considered an essential part of 
due diligence in ascertaining construct validity – since identity boundaries between 
religions are expected to be fuzzy and to some extent permeable. With an indication of 
what makes values less exclusively Buddhist (i.e. by taking a selection of values that at 
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face value relate to Buddhism and identifying which are also popular with non-
Buddhists), it might become easier to pin down, by elimination, what makes values 
particular to Buddhists. Lastly readers may need reminding that to fit concepts to a 
scientific framework is not the only important criterion for academic endeavour, since 
theory formation outside the scientific framework can also be considered valuable if it 
can be shown to be comprehensive, parsimonious or of applied value (Pennington 2003, 
15). 
 
Known benefits of quantitative research methodologies 
Nonetheless, there are known advantages to making studies quantifiable where possible. 
Employing quantitative methodologies for research on Buddhism has several 
advantages which include obtaining results that are repeatable, being generalizable, 
being able to handle both objective and subjective data, going beyond face validity and 
minimizing effects of observer bias 
 Experiments involving quantitative methods are more amenable to repetition 
than qualitative investigations. Since characteristics of participants such as sex, 
ethnicity, age or religious affiliation can be quantified, the experiment can be repeated 
on another sample with the same characteristics and a similar result would be expected. 
Successive waves of research can validly build upon one another. The ability to control 
for personal characteristics in this way is not available in qualitative research where 
each study may represent a unique instance of social behaviour. 
 Quantitative methodologies facilitate generalization from results. Given an 
adequate and representative sample size5 results can be extrapolated from the 
experimental sample to a larger population possessing the same personal characteristics. 
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 Quantitative data isn’t necessarily synonymous with objective measures – in fact 
it can sometimes imply the opposite – generating figures from subjective data. In the 
case of domestic heating, for example, ‘heat comfort’ could be quantified instead of 
‘temperature’ in applications where it is how warm people feel that matters rather than 
the temperature per se (as would be important for other applications such as storage of 
foodstuffs or seeds). Quantitative measure can reveal counter-intuitive experimental 
effects and allow latent or subconscious processes to be deduced from manifest 
measurable qualities. Such measures can be useful in cases where participants 
themselves are not self-aware concerning the underlying processes in the mind that 
affect their decisions; by quantitative analysis, factors can be teased out in a way that 
goes beyond face validity. Quantitative methods are thus a useful research tool in 
personality psychology where reliance on self-report (the phenomenological approach) 
is notoriously unreliable (Cooper 2002, 7-8).  
In triangulation with qualitative data, quantitative data may help to overcome 
constrictive worldviews of observers locked into outsider paradigms with reference to 
Buddhism (Choompolpaisal 2008) or blinkered views as insiders. Worries about 
observer bias common in ethnological techniques (Clifford and Marcus 1986) are less 
of an issue in a mixed-methods design such as that of the present research study. In the 
matter of scale construction, the benefits of involving one or more insiders at the design 
stage is likely to outweigh any possible disadvantages due to observer bias (Thanissaro 
2010d, 72). Being an insider to Buddhism, rather than causing objectivity to be lost, 
should help overcome many of the possible limitations non-Buddhist researchers face 
when trying to ‘bracket out’ non-Buddhist presuppositions. Since the usual way to 
bracket out assumptions is to engage with the participants by means of edification and 
empathy, an insider would be better qualified to do this – by entering the authentic 
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mindset of a Buddhist (Smart 1987, 4). If the present research had been based on more 
qualitative, reflexive data, the ‘partial, selective and personal’ nature of observations 
(Brewer 2000, 44-45) might deserve the concern about objectivity voiced by Pracharart 
(2004, 33) in a similar capacity, when undertaking recent participant observation in UK 
Buddhist temples – but the beauty of quantitative surveys is that experimenter influence 
can be minimized by delegating the administration of surveys to a helper. 
 
Known Shortcomings of quantitative research methodologies 
Despite the aforementioned strengths of quantitative methodologies, reliance on solely 
quantitative methodologies may have weaknesses which researchers need to take into 
account. Possible shortcomings of quantitative research methodologies (for young 
people in Buddhism) may include the following: glossing over sectarian differences, 
being insufficiently nuanced to understand young people, being limited to correlations 
rather than elucidating causes and effects, lack of perspective on long-term processes 
such as nurture or development, the temptation to unreasonable extrapolation 
(reification) and anomalies where respondents consistently misunderstand survey 
questions. After expanding on each of these possible criticisms, I will go on to mention 
how, in this study, I have attempted to minimize the shortcomings. 
There is the danger of being tied into a particular sectarian standpoint within 
Buddhism which may not be apparent to outsiders. There is sometimes a sectarian 
temptation to sneak a ‘favourable’ answer into the question or skew representativeness 
of sampling. Although randomized samples have never been available to me in the true 
sense of clinical trials, conscious that as a particular sort of insider, I might be 
influenced by my own denominational allegiances, I have intentionally included a 
variety of denominations and challenged the accuracy of my findings using multiple 
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hermeneutic cycles. At the distal end of the data processing there may also be 
weaknesses in the interpretation where particular answers are sought to fit with a 
theoretical framework fixed a priori by the researcher – so-called ‘cherry picking’ or 
‘data dredging’. Hopefully from my explanation of how the hermeneutic process has 
been governed by mixed-methods triangulation, it will be evident how observer 
interpretation has been minimized and that construction of the survey has been neither 
arbitrary, manipulated or based on anecdotal materials. 
 With young people, the exclusive use of quantitative research methods is 
thought potentially misleading as many of their distinguishing characteristics are subtle 
and nuanced (Andolina et al. 2002). The critical realism paradigm of research and 
enquiry to which this study belongs is one of the main defenders of the idea that social 
enquiry can be scientific (Kemp and Holmwood 2003, 165). In researching young 
people, I have made a consistent effort to draw on the strengths of both quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies as recommended by that paradigm. 
 Another limitation of much quantitative research is that it relies on correlation. 
Although it can detect if phenomena are linked statistically, the direction of causality 
cannot be ascertained without some sort of experimental intervention. Also it should be 
conceded that, of the seven aspects concluded by Ninian Smart (1992),6 only four 
aspects of religiosity have proved amenable to quantitative measure within individual 
differences psychology – namely, affiliation, belief, attitude and practice – and even 
these have only proved measurable giving them operational definitions (Hood et al. 
2009, 11-12). Furthermore, quantitative methodologies provide snapshots of social 
phenomena, but may lack perspective on the longer term processes at work. In my own 
research, including this article, I have thus made no claims about development or 
nurture. 
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 Anomalies may also arise in the conceptualization of religiosity if quantitative 
results are extrapolated or generalized beyond the populations in which they have been 
conceived. In recognition of this danger, for the measurement of attitude toward 
Christianity, Francis (1978) describes how he performed ‘due diligence’ in the initial 
survey design by shortlisting from 110 possible questions down to 24. The original 
questions appear to have been constructed by identifying the most important objects of 
faith for each religion (presumably chosen by affiliates of that religion) which were then 
used to construct statements or their reverse-coded equivalents – for Christianity, this 
formula yielded positive and negative statements on God, Jesus, the Church, the Bible 
and prayer. This worked well for Christianity because statements were shortlisted by an 
insider starting with many Christian-generated questions and using statistical methods 
to shortlist down to the most powerful questions in terms of reliability.7 Generally, 
analysis of reliability will select for questions that are clear and unambiguous, by 
drawing on multiple measures per object of enquiry and by being able to move towards 
a clearly defined construct for each scale – but this vouches only for the technical 
consistency of questions without guaranteeing that the questions have identified valid 
aspects of religiosity.8 When measuring attitude toward religion, as more generally, it is 
debatable how far it is acceptable to extrapolate results. When extrapolating measures of 
religiosity by a common scale across different Christian denominations, few anomalies 
would be expected. However, when extrapolating between Christianity and Hinduism, 
the anomalies might be more apparent since the accuracy with which Hinduism can be 
conceptualized is reduced, if forced into a monotheistic framework (Delmonico 2004, 
32). Jackson and Nesbitt (1993) have demonstrated the complications inherent in 
generalizing even within the Hindu religious tradition. As it is not clear whether the 
Francis-Santosh Scale of Attitude toward Hinduism (Francis et al. 2008) was designed 
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by a process of shortlisting from many grounded questions,9 it is possible that 
considerable intra-religious diversity10 may have been overlooked – hence, any 
unidimensionality assumed in the dataset might be an external imposition. Although 
what is measured may be internally consistent (i.e. reliable) this is no guarantee that the 
content validly reflects Hindu religiosity. It may, for example, be measuring a 
‘monotheist tendency’ in Hindus that might correlate statistically with other aspects of 
their practice. For Buddhism the effect is likely to be yet more pronounced as the 
theistic element is altogether missing. In short, reified views of religion, especially 
Buddhism, may result from the assumption, even for measurement of attitude toward 
religion, that religions share a common structure. For this reason, rather than the 
extrapolating from scales of attitude from other religions, I have consistently gone back 
to grounded qualitative data Buddhists themselves have generated when devising survey 
questions. 
 Lastly, there is the problem of respondents understanding survey questions 
differently than the researchers have anticipated. If a question is worded so that it is 
consistently misunderstood by young participants (for example, a researcher might 
understand the word ‘wicked’ in a different way from a young person) such a question 
might not fail in terms of reliability, but it would lead to invalid conclusions being 
drawn from data. By contrast, if a badly worded question creates confusion amongst the 
participants, the question will merely increase random error. In my research, the 
questions were piloted on a small number of respondents of the same age-group before 
the start of the survey, to minimize any effects of Buddhist jargon, to estimate time for 
completion and to make sure wording was unambiguous (which means that the 
participants claimed to have understood all the questions – even terms such as 
‘ultimately empty’ and ‘impermanence’). 
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Resistance to quantitative methods in Buddhist research  
In spite of precautions taken to avoid anomalies in quantitative methodologies, there are 
still several objections Buddhists seem to hold against studying Buddhism 
quantitatively.11 At the time of writing, the field of Buddhist studies has been largely 
dependent on non-empirical arguments and where supported empirically, have drawn 
largely on qualitative methodologies such as case studies, ethnology and interviews. 
Claims are often accepted without challenge, even when empirical evidence for them is 
lacking. Where quantitative data has been employed, it has often been based on 
relatively small sample sizes. When sweeping statements are made such as ‘if you 
cannot accept four things,12 you cannot be a Buddhist’ (Khyentse 2007, 4) or that 
Buddhism in Thailand is more ‘feminine’ than that of Japan (Hofstede 2001, 327) there 
is little to assure subsequent researchers (or the researched) that conclusions are based 
on anything more than anecdotal evidence. Analytic psychology, for example, has been 
criticised for lack of scientific rigour in its analysis of Buddhism (Yogo 2001), but these 
criticisms could equally well have been directed at other purely qualitative studies of the 
religion. In order to be scientifically acceptable (rather than metaphysics) a hypothesis 
un-verified by external senses (non-empirical) must at least be potentially falsifiable 
(the logical positivist requirement of ‘verifiability theory of meaning’) and it should 
help to form null-hypotheses from which statements can be deduced about future 
experiences (Carnap 1966).  
 The reduced dependence on interpretation implied by the use of quantitative data 
worries some, especially if it seems likely that the locus of expertise concerning 
Buddhism might be taken away from Buddhists and given to statisticians. Since the 
1960s the emancipatory research paradigm based on the work of Habermas, Frieire and 
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Marcuse, researchers have come to a consensus that research ought to be of benefit to 
the participants (Banks 2006), it is also important for me to demonstrate how the use of 
quantitative data continues to be of benefit to Buddhists themselves. For Buddhists, no 
less than for those of other religions, the spectre of vulgar positivism in Science (real or 
imagined) threatens to reduce the mystery of faith to (mere) figures or (perhaps more 
unpopularly) to a (someone else’s) particular set of criteria. Psychologists of religions 
who have been measuring aspects of religiosity from non-Buddhist religions since the 
early 1960s (Glock 1962) with no ‘vested’ or detailed interest in Buddhist diversity 
have tended not to share the qualms of religious participants in their research. 
Nonetheless, the applied quantification of religiosity within the individual differences 
paradigm of psychology, has proved beneficial – especially in modelling the effect of 
different orientations of religiosity and different styles of religious coping toward 
mental health (Maltby et al. 2010, 575-6). Previous quantitative research on Buddhists 
in the UK (e.g. Thanissaro 2010c) can also be considered emancipatory since it is 
helping give voice to the values of a marginalized group in British society (although it 
could be argued that the same emancipation might have been achieved by research 
employing qualitative methodology). Thus, it would be more reasonable to consider the 
aims, purpose and use of research when judging its potential benefit to the participants 
than to object to one broad method as opposed to another on the grounds of benefit to 
participants. Nonetheless, the application of quantitative methods to Buddhist religiosity 
demands fuller apologetics than would perhaps be required by even the more critical of 
psychologists of religion.  
 Quantification is not a complete stranger to Buddhist research, however. There is a 
growing literature of studies which have quantified aspects of Buddhist practice – often 
in the applied sciences. Buddhist religiosity has been sufficiently quantifiable to be 
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factored into research concerning psychiatry (Scotton 1998), alcohol abuse 
(Assanangkornchai et al. 2002), moral training (Pupatana 2000), psychosocial change 
(Thananart 2000), psychoanalytic defence mechanisms (Tori and Bilmes 2002), 
psychological therapy (de_Silva 1996) and learning English as a foreign language 
(Adamson 2003) – despite there never having been a specific study to map out Buddhist 
religiosity in a way that allows it to be compared with that of other religions.  
 Within Buddhist studies, at the more qualitative end of the quantitative-qualitative 
research continuum, there are scholars hesitant to settle for a particular translation of an 
academic text in case it threatens to reduce future possibilities for breadth of 
interpretation (Hubbard and Swanson 1997). At the other end of the continuum are the 
more positivist proponents of the Kālāma Sutta who might reject any conclusion not 
based on irrefutable evidence. In between come the latest social scientific paradigms 
and pragmatic theorists of scriptural exegesis. The philosophy of Hui-Neng13 and some 
Tibetan logic is no less social constructivist than the writing of George Berkeley.  
 In conclusion, I see no reason why Buddhism should lock itself into a particular 
methodology for its study. Buddhist studies as it currently stands incorporates a huge 
range of epistemologies – which should be no surprise, since where methodologies are 
to acknowledge change and complexity, multiple perspectives and discourses are 
required (Hartas 2010, 50-51). The essentialisms often inherent in the study of 
comparative religion were moderated by Wilfred Cantwell Smith who advocated 
avoiding the projection of terms onto other peoples’ views of life – saying “No 
interpretation of Buddhist doctrine is valid unless Buddhists can respond ‘Yes! That is 
what we hold’.” (1981, 97). Nonetheless, there is huge potential for anomalies if 
structures from believing religions are projected onto traditions that like Buddhism ‘do’ 
rather than ‘believe’. Instead of assuming similarities and differences, research should 
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be framed through debates about quality within different sub-communities and 
encouragement of open discussion across epistemological and methodological 
boundaries (Furlong 2004, 343). Thus, rather than assuming there to be something 
particularly un-Buddhist about representing personal qualities by numbers it is more 
likely that the new landscape of Buddhist studies (Crosby 2008) has simply not yet 
extended this far – and my recommendation would be that Buddhist studies could 
beneficially extend the scope of its research in the direction of quantitative 
methodologies. 
 
Part 2: Research Agenda, Methodology and Findings 
Having defended the use of quantitative methods in Buddhist studies, what follows in 
this part of the article describes a preliminary exploration of Buddhist religiosity by 
quantitative methods. The research agenda was not to form a scale, as I have already 
published this elsewhere (Thanissaro 2011a), but to explore cross-correlations and to 
map values at the border of identity of those self-identifying as non-Buddhists. This part 
of the article builds on an initial cycle of research grounded in the experiences of 
Buddhist adolescents through semi-structured interviews with a preliminary small 
sample of Buddhist families selected from several ethnic groups and Buddhist 
denominations in Britain (Thanissaro 2011b). The findings from that research were used 
to devise attitude questions which were added to others previously designed by Smith 
and Kay (2000)14 to acknowledge (but also give a fair test of) pre-existing studies, while 
building on their strengths. Data capture on attitude toward Buddhism was designed to 
investigate the intellectual aspects previously researched in Smith and Kay’s work – but 
also the more affective aspects of Buddhism shown important by Thanissaro (2011b) 
such as generosity, welfare, honouring those worthy of respect, belief in the Law of 
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Karma, belief in an afterlife, enlightenment, alcohol, killing animals and filial piety – 
the last three issues having been piloted in detail – to test whether particular degrees of 
values were unique to Buddhists, since Cush (1996, 205) has suggested that aspects of 
Buddhism such as belief in meditation, other realms, rebirth and interconnectedness 
enjoy popularity even with those who would not consider themselves Buddhist. The 
questions were fed back into this initial round of selection of Buddhist attitude 
questions by elimination – trial through quantitative methods on a group of non-
Buddhist adolescents in London schools (Thanissaro 2010a; b; c).  
It should be conceded that at this stage, the research questions described in this 
article represent a provisional shortlist that is part of an abductive process leading 
towards a more valid set of questions to be described in forthcoming publications.  
 
Method 
Sample 
Research was undertaken upon a convenience sample of 352 young people – 226 males 
and 126 females – aged between 13 and 15 years attending London schools. Ethnically 
the sample included 150 whites (43%), 105 blacks (30%), 46 Asians (13%), 40 of 
mixed race (12%) and 5 Chinese (1%). The sample has been characterized as non-
Buddhist, because it comprised those self-identifying for religion as 149 Christians 
(42%), 120 of no religion (34%), 45 Moslems (13%), 17 Hindus (5%), 5 Sikhs (1%), 3 
Jews (1%) and 13 of other15 religions (4%). Of the pupils in the sample, 49% had 
studied Buddhism in their Religious Education lessons of the previous year. 
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Procedure and Analysis 
A multi-purpose survey [detail of which can be found in Thanissaro (2010c, 184-191)] 
was deployed as part of a wider research project. The survey contained biographical 
questions ascertaining independent variables such as age, sex and self-assigned religious 
affiliation adapted from Francis’s (2001a) adolescent values inventory and 49 Likert 
five-point scale (strongly agree – agree – not certain – disagree – disagree strongly) 
attitude statements.16 Some of these questions might have been rejected a priori, but for 
this study the ‘naïve’ outlook of grounded theory tests questions empirically rather than 
making an a priori selection by face validity. Two reverse-coded statements were 
included in the Buddhism section, namely, “It is possible to reach salvation only 
through the help of God” and “I think the Buddhist festivals are based on fairy-stories” 
as a strategy to guard against inclusion of results from participants who had 
mechanically ticked the same column throughout regardless of their true attitudes.  
 Schools volunteered their participation in response to a circular letter from their 
local Standing Advisory Council on Religious Education. Surveys were delivered to 
participating schools in the quantities they required and administered to pupils by Year 
9 and 10 teachers under examination conditions in their regular RE classes in the period 
January and February 2010. In keeping with constraints of ethical approval non-
consenting pupils had the option of destroying their questionnaires after completion 
instead of submitting them and completed surveys were kept anonymous to protect 
participants from having their views traced back to them. The resulting dataset was 
analyzed by means of the SPSS statistical package (SPSS_Inc. 1988) using the 
frequency and cross-tabulation routines.  
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Results 
Overview of Attitudes to Buddhism 
Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview respectively of the highest and lowest levels of 
agreement with Buddhist statements amongst the non-Buddhist sample. Although the 
survey used a five-point continuum, for clarity of presentation, the ‘agree strongly’ and 
‘agree’ responses were recoded into a single category styled ‘agree’ and the ‘disagree 
strongly’ and ‘disagree’ responses have been similarly recoded into a single category 
styled ‘disagree’. In the ranking of Tables 1 and 2, reverse-coded statements were not 
included to avoid possible confusion involving double negatives. 
 
 
As shown in Table 1, the top ten Buddhist value statements agreed with by non-
Buddhists concerned taking care of parents in old age (48%), compassion towards 
(cuddly) animals (44%), the Law of Karma (38%/37%), not wanting to kill any animal 
(35%), valuing a calm mind (33%), having respect for those worthy of respect (41%) or 
those who had previously given them special help (32%), the subjectivity of happiness 
(33%) and generosity to the poor and needy (29%). 
 
Table 1. Agreement with Buddhist Attitude Statements (Highest Ten) 
 
% 
agree 
% 
Not 
certain 
% 
disagree 
I would look after my parents in their own home in their old age 48 46 6 
It sickens me when cuddly animals are killed 44 38 18 
If you are a Buddhist it is important to have respect for those worthy of 
respect 41 52 6 
What goes around comes around 38 57 5 
If a person does good deeds, good things will come back to them 37 58 5 
I would not want to kill any sort of animal 35 42 23 
Whether we enjoy life or hate it depends on how we see the world 33 63 4 
I think the Buddhist idea of having a calm mind is a good one 33 63 3 
Some people who have helped us a lot deserve our special respect 32 64 4 
It is necessary for us to give support to the poor and needy 29 67 4 
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Table 2 shows the ten value statements which elicited the least agreement amongst non-
Buddhists and which potentially represent the values that make a person Buddhist. 
These concerned Buddhist abstinence from alcohol (14%), friendship on Sangha Day 
(14%), respecting ordination as a monk or nun (13%), the benefit to the world of being 
a monk (8%), meditation (15%) and the worth of spending time meditating (11%), 
offering flowers and incense at a Buddhist shrine (13%), the emptiness (8%) and 
impermanence (6%) of the world and Nirvana as ultimate peace (6%). 
 
Comparisons 
Comparisons were made using the independent variables of sex, age and religious 
affiliation.17 
 
Table 2. Agreement with Buddhist Attitude Statements (Lowest Ten) 
 
% 
agree 
% 
Not 
certain 
% 
disagree 
I like the way Buddhists train their minds through prayer and meditation 15 78 8 
I like the Buddhist idea of encouraging people to become friends on 
Sangha Day 14 78 7 
It is important for Buddhists to avoid drinking alcohol 14 78 8 
I respect the way some Buddhists spend time in meditation by becoming 
monks or nuns 13 80 7 
I like the way Buddhists offer flowers and incense to statues of Buddha 13 77 10 
Spending time meditating is a constructive use of one's time 11 80 8 
Spending time as a Buddhist monk benefits the world at large 8 82 10 
Everything that happens to us in this world is ultimately empty 8 81 11 
Nirvana is the ultimate peace 6 83 11 
Every compounded thing is impermanent 6 66 7 
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Sex Differences 
Table 3 Comparison between male and female pupils 
 Male % 
Agree 
Female % 
Agree χ2 p< 
It is important for Buddhists not to kill any sort of animal 13 25 7.25 .01 
Buddhists are to be admired for their respect for all living 
things 15 28 9.01 .01 
I would not want to kill any sort of animal 26 51 21.42 .001 
I consider hunting to be an enjoyable sport® 26 3 28.20 .001 
It sickens me when cuddly animals are killed 34 62 25.43 .001 
I consider fishing to be an enjoyable sport® 38 24 7.00 .01 
Everyone should take care of their parents in their old age 25 36 4.33 .05 
I would look after my parents in their old age only if they 
asked® 24 40 10.01 .01 
I would look after my parents in their own home in their old 
age 43 56 5.47 .05 
It is important for Buddhists to look after their parents in their 
old age 21 31 4.52 .05 
It is important for Buddhists to have respect for those worthy 
of respect 14 25 6.87 .01 
Some people who have helped us a lot deserve our special 
respect 24 46 19.10 .001 
It is necessary for us to share what we have with others 19 36 13.09 .001 
It is necessary for us to give support to the poor and needy 21 44 21.86 .001 
I respect Buddhists for giving food and money to their 
monks 17 32 10.46 .01 
What goes around comes around 29 53 20.57 .001 
If a person does good deeds, good things come back to 
them 29 50 15.07 .001 
I think it is okay to drink in moderation (not so much you are 
drunk)® 32 60 26.89 .001 
I would drink only to be sociable® 18 34 12.12 .001 
Heaven and hell exist as places where people can be 
reborn 13 21 3.96 .05 
I respect the Buddhist idea that understanding is more 
important than belief 16 29 7.95 .01 
Whether we enjoy life or hate it depends on how we see the 
world 27 43 8.71 .01 
I think the Buddhist idea of having a calm mind is a good 
one 26 45 12.73 .001 
I respect the way some Buddhists spend time in meditation 
by becoming monks or nuns 10 19 6.18 .05 
Like how Buddhists offer flowers and incense to Buddha 
statues 10 20 7.14 .01 
I like the Buddhist idea of encouraging people to become 
friends on Sangha Day 11 20 5.12 .05 
Note: Only significant Chi-squared test scores included. N= 226 males and 126 females. 
 
Generally speaking, the psychology of religion has found that female subjects are more 
positive on scales of attitude to religion (Hood et al. 2009, 152). The finding for 
adolescent attitude to Buddhism by contrast, was that in 24 of 49 items, there was no 
significant difference between males and females. Nevertheless, the remainder of values 
statements showed a stronger level of female agreement in accordance with the usual 
expectations for religious values. Items where a significant difference between males 
 23
and females was found according to a Pearson Chi-squared test (two-tailed) are shown 
in Table 3 above. In some Buddhist and more general values including respect for living 
beings, care of parents in old age and respect for those worthy of respect, generosity, the 
Law of Karma and Buddhist beliefs (heaven & hell, understanding being more 
important than belief, subjectivity of happiness, advantages of a calm mind, value of 
ordination, devotional offering and encouraging friendship on Sangha Day) females 
showed a more positive attitude. Only in the case of moderate or sociable drinking 
(which were in any case reverse-coded statements, contradicting Buddhist values) did 
the males have a significantly higher level of agreement. 
 
Age Differences 
Table 4 Comparison between Year 9 and Year 10 pupils 
 
Y9 % 
agree 
Y10 % 
agree χ2 p< 
It is okay to drink as much alcohol as you want® 25 34 3.46 .05 
If you are a Buddhist it is important to avoid drinking alcohol 31 14 12.72 .001 
I would avoid drinking alcohol under any circumstances 22 13 4.60 .05 
Spending time as a Buddhist monk is beneficial to the world at 
large 11 4 5.40 .05 
Everything that happens to us in this world is ultimately empty 11 4 4.67 .05 
If you are Buddhist it is important to spend time meditating 31 19 5.78 .05 
The Buddhist idea of reincarnation (being reborn) makes 
sense 19 8 
7.63 .01 
I would not want to kill any sort of animal 39 28 4.45 .05 
If you are a Buddhist it is important to have respect for those 
worthy of respect 46 33 5.58 .05 
I would look after my parents in their own home in their old 
age 53 40 5.63 .05 
I would drink only to be sociable® 27 18 4.09 .05 
It is possible to reach salvation only though the help of God® 16 6 7.52 .01 
Note: Only significant Chi-squared test scores included. N= 217 from Year Nine and 135 from Year Ten. 
 
The expected finding when correlating age against attitude to religion is that attitude 
should become less positive with age (Francis 2001b, 81). However, for questions 
concerning attitude to Buddhism, the age difference between Year 9 and Year 10 pupils 
made no significant difference for 37 of the 49 items. The exceptions to this are shown 
in Table 4 above, where younger children had a more positive attitude to value 
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statements in the case of avoiding alcohol, ordination, the ultimate emptiness of the 
world, meditation, reincarnation, not killing animals, respecting those worthy of respect, 
looking after parents in old age and the non-Buddhist values of sociable drinking, and 
salvation through God. Older children had a higher level of agreement than the younger 
ones only in the case of consuming of as much alcohol as they liked – which was in any 
case, a reverse-coded statement. Buddhist value statements therefore conformed with 
the usual expectation in attitude toward religion measurements of attitude becoming less 
positive with age. 
Differences by religious affiliation 
Table 5. Comparison by religious affiliation 
 
no 
religion 
% agree 
Dharmic 
% agree 
Abrahamic 
% agree χ2 p< 
Some people who have helped us a lot deserve our 
special respect 40 27 27 6.12 .05 
I respect the Buddhist idea that understanding is 
more important than belief 28 14 16 7.98 .05 
The Buddhist idea of reincarnation (being reborn) 
makes sense 22 14 11 6.47 .05 
I think Buddhist festivals are based on fairy-
stories® 13 4 5 7.31 .05 
I would drink only to be sociable® 32 14 23 9.69 .01 
It is okay to drink as much alcohol as you want® 42 9 21 20.77 .001 
I would avoid drinking alcohol under any 
circumstances 12 36 21 9.23 .05 
Spending time meditating is a constructive use of 
one's time 12 32 9 9.87 .01 
I would find an old peoples' home for my parents in 
their old age® 20 59 29 14.55 .01 
The Buddhist Noble Eightfold Path seems a very 
good way to achieve happiness 18 32 12 7.16 .05 
Nirvana is the ultimate peace 10 9 3 6.93 .05 
I respect Buddhists for giving food and money to 
their monks 30 27 18 6.64 .05 
Note: Only significant Chi-squared test scores included. N= 120 of no religion, 22 from Dharmic religions 
and 197 from Abrahamic religions. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Analysis of attitude results by religious affiliation (where limited numbers allowed only 
a three way division into ‘No Religion’, Dharmic and Abrahamic religions) showed 
significant polarization of opinion [see Table 5 above] on only 12 of the 49 questions 
asked. 
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 The Dharmic group of religions (Hinduism and Sikhism) seemed to resemble 
Buddhism particularly closely in its attitude to abstaining from alcohol, meditation as a 
constructive use of one’s time, caring for parents in an old people’s home and the value 
of the Noble Eightfold Path. On the contrary, it was the Abrahamic religions 
(Christianity, Islam and Judaism) that differed most from Buddhist attitudes by not 
agreeing with Nirvana or the support of Buddhist monks. By comparison, the non-
religious favoured Buddhist attitudes more than religious affiliates by being keener on 
belief based on understanding, reincarnation and respect for those worthy of respect.  
 
Part 3: Discussion 
The present article has been a study in discriminative validity for Buddhist values. The 
study admittedly depends on the assumption that it is reasonable to extrapolate between 
‘attitude toward Buddhism’ and ‘Buddhist attitude’. There remains a possibility 
however, that the distinction between having a positive attitude to Buddhism (as a non-
Buddhist) and having Buddhist attitudes (as a Buddhist) may be larger than anticipated 
– in consequence of which the article title retains the word ‘preliminary’. Nonetheless, 
the study has produced noteworthy outcomes on two fronts – possible new 
understanding of Buddhist religiosity and support for policy and practice enactable in 
contexts where non-Buddhists need to be informed about Buddhism in order to give a 
positive attitude.  
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New understanding of Buddhist religiosity 
 
 
Figure 1 is a graphic comparison of ‘Buddhist’ values that are potentially exclusive to 
Buddhists and those that overlap with non-Buddhists, combining the results from Tables 
1 and 2. The figure maps the values boundaries of self-identified religious affiliation. 
Aspects of Buddhism that at face value might seem representative of Buddhism, upon 
experimentation turned out not to be exclusive to Buddhism (in terms of concept 
validity) and therefore would be unreliable as identifiers of Buddhist religiosity for 
future research. Values such as valuing a calm mind or the Law of Karma – where face 
validity might lead one to assume that one is dealing with features of Buddhist 
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religiosity – were actually shared by adolescents of a non-Buddhist sample. It would 
appear that few values that we might associate with Buddhists are exclusive to 
Buddhism – but if a person were to lack these few items from their ‘values footprint’ it 
would correspond with ‘what makes one not a Buddhist’. There is some support from 
this study for what Khyentse (2007, 4) claims – especially putting store by the belief 
that all things are impermanent and empty. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Buddhist values overlapping with non-Buddhists of self-assigned groups 
 
Figure 2 analyses the ‘Buddhist’ values overlapping with non-Buddhists in terms of 
self-assigned religious group. The figure shows how conceptually difficult it is to 
identify exclusively Buddhist values. It would seem instead that religious identity 
including that of Buddhism has fuzzy boundaries which may indicate Buddhist identity 
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being many-layered. At the very minimum, the layers of ‘tradition’, ‘group’ and 
‘individual’ identified by Jackson (1997, 65) would seem relevant here – a perspective 
that would take the understanding of Buddhist values beyond the essentialisms of 
comparative religion. Removing the values shared by the Dharmic religions of Figure 2 
from the Buddhist values of Figure 1 leaves offering flowers & incense, emptiness, 
impermanence, Nirvana, Sangha Day and ordination – which might indicate a starting 
place for the elucidation of exclusively Buddhist values in future research. 
Alternatively, it may be that the Buddhist identity exists as a particular combination of 
values – a possibility testable by quantitative methods of a large enough sample of 
Buddhist participants could be surveyed by multifactorial analysis. 
  Furthermore, in terms of sex, affinity for Buddhist attitudes seemed to be more 
affective for girls. Age seems to have a smaller impact on enthusiasm for Buddhist 
values than would be expected in relation to values from other religions. The findings 
also help avoid stereotyping adolescents (emancipatory) – especially those of no 
religious affiliation as apathetic toward religious values – which is what tends to happen 
in the absence of information or if the wrong questions are asked or if the research is not 
grounded/bottom-up. A direct outcome of this research is that we see that religious 
apathy is a myth – as adolescents find Buddhism relatively exciting whereas other 
religions may lead to boredom with education about religion (Thanissaro 2011a, 800). 
 
Support for policy that is enactable 
This study has concerned itself with Buddhism through the eyes of non-Buddhists and 
has particular relevance in situations where Buddhism needs to be taught in a non-
Buddhist context – contexts which might include education about religion or 
community awareness initiatives in a religiously plural society. Experimental outcomes 
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suggest that Buddhist values particularly commend themselves to be widely taught 
amongst non-Buddhists and the way Buddhism is presently taught in non-Buddhist 
contexts may need modification.  
Buddhism would appear accessible in non-Buddhist contexts because it causes 
relatively low polarization of opinion for those of other religions, appeals to both sexes 
and causes enthusiasm to drop away more slowly with age than for other religions. 
Given that values from a variety of religions need to be taught in the plural classroom, 
Buddhist values may provide a useful resource for teachers, since ‘awareness of shared 
values’ is considered by the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) as one of 
the keys to developing the Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural (QCA 1998, 23). As 
this research has highlighted many shared values, these could be put to relevant use in 
the classroom, especially in such applications as teaching responsibility toward alcohol. 
Also in terms of age, as there does not seem to be such a dramatic decline in enthusiasm 
for schoolchildren studying Buddhism compared to other religions, this would seem to 
commend the teaching of Buddhism for schoolchildren of higher age ranges.  
Ways in which the teaching of Buddhism in a non-Buddhist context could 
helpfully be modified would be to avoid over-intellectualizing the subject and by 
contrast to include more affective content and narratives. This research indicates that the 
comparative religions framework of artefacts, objects of faith and western intellectual 
understanding of Buddhism in general had missed the point about many aspects of 
Buddhism that make it unique as a religion. If, as this study suggests, it is true that 
males and females are drawn to Buddhism by different facets, females favouring more 
affective aspects such as compassion, filial piety, gratitude, generosity, friendship, the 
Law of Karma and devotions, it would be more effective when introducing Buddhism to 
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non-Buddhists to give a good selection of both affective and intellectual aspects, as 
previously the affective facets have been neglected (Thanissaro 2011b, 70).  
  
Suggestions for further research 
It would be suggested that future researchers expand the sample size, since this study is 
based on a relatively small sample of London adolescents meaning results may be at the 
most indicative of trends in the UK or further afield. Buddhist-affiliated adolescents 
need to be included in future studies as a question mark remains concerning the sort of 
values that are exclusively Buddhist. If future research can extend the enquiry to 
Buddhists themselves, the question of ‘What makes a person Buddhist?’ could more 
confidently be answered. Further clarity in this respect could also be gained by drawing 
on additional qualitative sources of triangulation which might include issues raised by 
Buddhists as important to their practice (e.g. Loundon 2001; 2006) and undertaking 
focus groups with Buddhists to rank their own values in order of priority. Correlating 
religious involvement of Buddhists with their attitudes to Buddhist value statements has 
not been possible in the present study – but for research in this area to progress, it will 
become necessary to gain an idea of the values of Buddhists who are more or less 
involved with their own religion, in terms of daily practice, temple attendance or other 
possible indicators of Buddhist piety. To test whether values differences can be 
attributed to group or tradition larger numbers would need to be sampled to make 
analysis possible in terms of ethnic group and Buddhist denomination. 
 Finally, without quantitative methods none of the research described here would 
have been possible and this methodological style is therefore commended as a useful for 
the wider study of Buddhism and Buddhists, with the provisos mentioned earlier of 
being properly triangulated with qualitative approaches to the subject.  
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(Yogo 2001) (Chakravarti 1991, 71; Rogers 2009, 109) 
APPENDIX 1: 49 Buddhist Attitude Statements in decreasing order of popularity 
1. I would look after my parents in their own home in their old age 
2. It sickens me when cuddly animals are killed 
3. I think it is okay to drink in moderation (not so much you are drunk)® 
4. If you are a Buddhist it is important to have respect for those worthy of respect 
5. What goes around comes around 
6. If a person does good deeds, good things will come back to them 
7. Whether we enjoy life or hate it depends on how we see the world 
8. I think the Buddhist idea of having a calm mind is a good one 
9. I consider fishing to be an enjoyable sport® 
10. I would not want to kill any sort of animal 
11. Some people who have helped us a lot deserve our special respect 
12. I would look after my parents in their old age only if they asked® 
13. It is necessary for us to give support to the poor and needy 
14. Everyone should take care of their parents in their old age 
15. I would not want to look after my parents in their old age® 
16. I would find an old peoples' home for my parents in their old age® 
17. It is okay to drink as much alcohol as you want® 
18. If you are Buddhist it is important to spend time meditating 
19. It is necessary for us to share what we have with others 
20. If you are a Buddhist it is important not to kill any sort of animal 
21. If you are a Buddhist it is important to avoid drinking alcohol 
22. If you are a Buddhist it is important to look after your parents in their old age 
23. I would drink only to be sociable® 
24. It is important for Buddhists to look after their parents in their old age 
25. I respect Buddhists for giving food and money to their monks 
26. I find it inspiring to hear Buddhist stories 
27. I respect the Buddhist idea that understanding is more important than belief 
28. I think it is justified to kill animals if they are pests® 
29. Buddhists are to be admired for their respect for all living things 
30. I would avoid drinking alcohol under any circumstances 
31. I consider hunting to be an enjoyable sport® 
32. It is important for Buddhists to have respect for those worthy of respect 
33. It is important for Buddhists not to kill any sort of animal 
34. Heaven and hell exist as places where people can be reborn 
35. The Buddhist Noble Eightfold Path seems a very good way to achieve happiness 
36. It is important for Buddhists to spend time meditating 
37. The Buddhist idea of reincarnation (being reborn) makes sense 
38. I like the way Buddhists train their minds through prayer and meditation 
39. I like the Buddhist idea of encouraging people to become friends on Sangha Day 
40. It is important for Buddhists to avoid drinking alcohol 
41. I respect the way some Buddhists spend time in meditation by becoming monks or nuns 
42. I like the way Buddhists offer flowers and incense to statues of Buddha 
43. It is possible to reach salvation only though the help of God® 
44. Spending time meditating is a constructive use of one's time 
45. I think Buddhist festivals are based on fairy-stories® 
46. Spending time as a Buddhist monk is beneficial to the world at large 
47. Everything that happens to us in this world is ultimately empty 
48. Nirvana is the ultimate peace 
49. Every compounded thing is impermanent 
® Indicates reverse coded statements 
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1  The author would like to thank Dr. Mandy Robbins (Glyndŵr University) for supervision of the 
original research, Denise Chaplin (RE advisor to Southwark) and Greenwich SACRE for facilitation 
of schools access, Revd. Canon Prof. Leslie J. Francis (University of Warwick), Prof. Steve Strand 
(University of Warwick), Dr. Andrew Skilton (SOAS, University of London) and the anonymous 
reviewers for critique and encouragement, Phra Kru Sangharak Veera Virandharo, Kannika Parker, 
Anuchit Treerattanajutawat, Bhuzaneezah Boonthucksa and Apassara Sangrungreang for 
administrative assistance and the Teachers Development Agency and Dhammakāya International 
Society of the United Kingdom which co-sponsored the cost of this research. 
2  www.brin.ac.uk 
3  At the time of publication, a selection of such journals would include Archiv für Religionspsychologie, 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Pastoral Psychology, Journal of Empirical Theology and 
Review of Religious Research 
4  Judaism, Sikhism and Hinduism are also underrepresented in quantitative research 
5  For the purpose of most significance testing a sample of more than one hundred participants would be 
preferable. 
6  Doctrine, Mythology, Ethics, Ritual, Experience, Institution, Material 
7  Although some limitations may be experienced when the scale is applied to certain denominations of 
Christianity outside the ‘mainstream’, pers. comm. (Francis 6 June 2011) 
8  Phrenology is a historical example where this distinction was particularly pertinent. 
9  It appears that the Hindu scale was constructed by effecting a transposition of the terms for objects of 
faith from the Christian scale by retaining the word ‘God’ [not allowing for Hindu views that span a 
wide range of theistic beliefs], and simply substituting ‘Hindu rituals’ for ‘Church service’ and ‘Hindu 
scriptures’ for ‘the Bible’. 
10  Hindu beliefs may typically be diverse as monotheism, polytheism, panentheism, pantheism, monism, 
atheism and agnosticism (Chakravarti 1991, 71; Rogers 2009, 109). 
11  Perhaps reflecting King Pāyāsi’s comeuppance in the early Buddhist scriptures (D.ii.316f.), in his 
efforts to study metaphysics empirically. 
12  All things are impermanent; all emotions bring pain and suffering; all phenomena are empty and 
illusory, and; enlightenment is above all concepts and a release from delusion. 
13  A flag said to flap in breeze not because of the movement of the flag or the breeze but because of 
movement in the mind of the perceiver. 
14  It was not clear whether Smith & Kay’s questions were grounded in the actual experience of Buddhist 
young people 
15  None of the ‘other religions’ were Buddhist 
16  See Appendix 1 
17  Correlations with degree of religious involvement such as attendance of a place of worship, frequency 
of prayer and frequency of reading religious scriptures were omitted since respondents’ involvement 
and the value statements they were responding to were derived from two different religions. Although 
showing some significant correlations (especially concerning abstinence from alcohol and belief in 
God) the measures did not link relevantly with previous research. Nonetheless, I have published 
correlations with two additional indicators of religious involvement, possessing a home shrine and 
bowing to parents, elsewhere (Thanissaro 2010a; b). 
